

JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL

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Joint Advanced Warfighting School

When the United States employs military power, it does so as a joint force. The cornerstone for effective joint force employment remains Service competency, but truly effective Service warfighters must think, plan and fight jointly. The key to developing officers who can think, plan and fight jointly is education. The vehicles employed to attain that objective are known as Service Professional Military Education (PME) and Joint Professional Military Education (JPME).

In 1987, the House Armed Services Committee established a Panel on Military Education chaired by Representative Ike Skelton (D-Mo). This panel's findings and recommendations led to numerous reforms in the U.S. military JPME program. The panel studied Service PME programs at both the Intermediate Level School (ILS) and Top Level School/Senior Service College (TLS/SSC) to ensure that U.S. officers changed from Service-centric to joint thinkers, planners and warfighters.

In 2002, General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated he wanted to "expand and improve JPME in order to develop trust amongst the services, ensure service integration, develop transformational leaders, capable of working with other agencies and services, to incorporate observations from recent operations and to educate and train the right person for the right task at the right time."¹ The Joint Staff J-7 Division is currently working on ways to meet the Chairman's goals. One of the areas it is studying is the creation of a Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS).² JAWS would emulate the highly successful Service post-ILS advanced courses: the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), the Marine Corps' School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW), and the Air Force's School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS). These schools, the Advanced Warfighting Schools(AWS), allow se-

lected majors and lieutenant commanders (O-4s) to spend a full year thinking, problem solving and studying the operational level of war following graduation from their respective ILS.

The Services are looking more and more to their AWS graduates to provide sound operational input to the joint planning process. As gifted as these officers are in problem solving and employing their Service competencies, they lack the full knowledge to employ those capabilities from a joint perspective. In essence, what is missing is a joint focus in U.S. services' AWS, as noted by the Skelton panel in 1989.³ Such a joint focus can be best obtained by establishing a JAWS CAPSTONE course. Several pertinent issues to be addressed are the role of military education in preparing or transforming military forces to meet future challenges, accurate descriptions of current Service Advanced Warfighting Schools, analysis of several JAWS implementation options, and the challenges associated with creating a JAWS CAPSTONE course.

History

There is nothing new about the idea of modern nations turning to enhanced military education to help them transform their forces. While new equipment and technologies can enhance a nation's military capability to fight more effectively, it will be the new ways these advances are used by people that ushers in a "transformational" capability—or a revolution in military affairs (RMA). To develop leaders able to deal effectively with new threats, capabilities or change, the most successful militaries developed military education institutions that ultimately gave their students the intellectual tools to both transform their militaries and fight for them effectively. Three examples come to mind: Scharnhorst's reform of the Prussian military after its defeat at Jena in 1806, the role of the U.S. Service schools in transforming the U.S. military in the 1920s and 1930s, and the United States' post-Vietnam War development of Advanced Warfighting

Schools that created highly capable problem solvers and operational planners in its field-grade officer ranks.

Scharnhorst and the Kriegsakademie

The Prussian nobility was stunned when Napoleon and his army of French peasants defeated the once proud Prussian military at Jena in 1806. Napoleon's decision making and the speed in which his forces could move to battle overwhelmed virtually every military force they encountered. Bewildered in defeat, the Prussian nobility swallowed its pride and turned to Scharnhorst, a soldier-educator, who in 1801 gained notoriety by starting a military society (Militarische Gesellschaft) in Berlin espousing the need to reform the Prussian military.

From 1801 to 1806 Scharnhorst instructed and cultivated a group of young officers he considered to be the best and the brightest in the Prussian military. His Military Society discussed the necessity to reform the Prussian military, enabling officers to rise in rank based upon merit rather than class or social standing. Scharnhorst maintained that "without a formal system of military education, the Prussian army's leadership would never be capable of coping with the conditions of modern war."⁴

The Prussian nobility tolerated the Military Society, but failed to implement Scharnhorst's reforms. Napoleon's 1806 victory changed their minds. With the belated blessing of the Prussian nobility, Scharnhorst successfully lobbied to change the officer selection process from one based upon social standing to one based upon a man's "exceptional bravery and quickness of perception."⁵ Scharnhorst focused his reform efforts on creating a military educational system that developed aggressive and intellectually agile officers—the tools he thought were necessary to defeat Napoleon.

Scharnhorst created a three-tiered military educational system. The first tier was a four-year course that prepared prospective officers for their entrance exams. The second tier consisted of three Schools of War, offering a nine-month course for those soldiers desiring a commission. The third tier was the Kriegsakademie, which would enroll a very small number of promising officers in a three-year advanced military education school in the art of war.⁶ Upon graduation, these officers would serve as planners and problem solvers on the General Staff or as adjutants helping field commanders make correct decisions in combat.

Five years later, a transformed Prussian army marched into battle in the Wars of Liberation (1813-1815) and emerged victorious. That victory can be directly attributed to Scharnhorst, and his Kriegsakademie graduates who manned the General Staff and advised the Prussian field commanders throughout the campaign.⁷

Interwar Years

The U.S. military entered the First World War as a latecomer. Even though victorious, the Army and Marine Corps infantry and aviation forces found themselves woefully unprepared for a battlefield that had changed rapidly over the course of four years of combat. Following the war, the nation demobilized, giving military procurement and training a low priority in the federal budget. The Great Depression in 1929 only made matters worse. The young officers who survived the war and remained in the military found it very difficult to train and keep abreast of the latest military tactics and technologies.

The postwar peace treaties and advances in technology created a new set of strategic and operational challenges for the U.S. military to deal with. The Washington Naval Treaty, which increased the naval power of Japan, led to the generation of War Plan Orange, in which the United States would repel Japanese aggression in the Pacific through naval, air and amphibious

power. In 1921, Douhet wrote *Command of the Air*, which called for the creation of strategic bomber forces capable of delivering bombs and poison gas on urban centers in an effort to quickly reduce an opponent's will to fight.⁸ The introduction of the tank in the latter part of the war held great promise to revolutionize land combat, as did the aircraft carrier to naval combat. Unfortunately, while the U.S. military knew serious threats loomed on the horizon, it had very few resources with which to equip or train its meager forces. Realizing this fact, the leadership of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps invested their money in education.

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, each Service sent its best and brightest to PME courses. The most important courses were the Command and General Staff College (C&GSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the Army War College in Washington, D.C., and the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, and, to a lesser extent, the Marine Command and Staff College at Quantico, Virginia, and the Army Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The Army and Navy War Colleges were where the major war plans were developed, and all of the Services sent students to each. Once enrolled, the students found the courses demanding, and competition to succeed was keen. In addition, officers from all Services found it nearly impossible to win promotion unless they had attended and done well at these schools.⁹

Leavenworth, Washington, Newport, and Quantico also served as the epicenters of service transformation efforts. War games and experiments involving large-scale armored warfare, aircraft carrier battle groups, amphibious assault, and strategic bombing were all conducted and planned from the schoolhouses during the interwar years. Students were called on to write doctrine, tactics and procedures for the newest operational concepts. For example, Marine and Navy students at Quantico's Staff College wrote the doctrine for amphibious assault, which the Army and Marine Corps used as a template for amphibious operations throughout the Second World

War. By the time the United States went to war in 1941, the military had developed not only new and revolutionary technologies to fight with, but also a cadre of highly educated officers. These officers were versed in the capabilities of the other Services that deftly employed those new technologies to defeat the Axis.

Another school of influence was the Army's Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, headed by General George Marshall. General Marshall took great interest in the Army officers attending the school and kept records of the students performing the best academically and in field problems. He kept track of these officers throughout their careers, and, when the United States entered the Second World War, he called upon those officers he thought showed the most promise as students in his school to lead the Army.¹⁰

Post-Vietnam: The Advanced Schools

The U.S. military was in a state of disrepair in the years following its withdrawal from Vietnam. In many ways the failure of the United States to achieve its political objectives through military action in Vietnam served as its Jena. Even in defeat, the United States continued to be a superpower and the primary foil to Soviet expansion and aggression throughout the world. While the United States struggled to rebuild its military forces, it participated in several contingency operations in which operational planning seemed to fall short of the standard.

In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. military refocused its operational doctrine on countering the Soviet threat. The Army began to procure new equipment, such as the Abrams tank, Bradley fighting vehicle, Apache attack helicopter, Patriot air defense system and Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS); experimented with and adopted new operational concepts such as the AirLandBattle; and tested its new equipment and concepts at the National Training Center in the Mojave Desert near Barstow, California. To take full advantage of

the new equipment and concepts, the Army required field-grade officers who could think, plan and fight effectively at the operational level of war. The Army discovered that its field-grade officers were not equipped with the experience or the academic background to do so. In response, the Army turned to education to solve its problem.¹¹

Under the direction of Colonel Wass de Czege, the Army created a School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) in 1982, selecting a group of 12 officers who showed promise in the C&GSC course for a follow-on year of advanced instruction in the art of war. The graduates of that course were later heavily involved in the planning and execution of the Army's portion of the highly successful land campaign in DESERT STORM.¹² The impact these officers had on Army combat effectiveness undoubtedly convinced the other Services that they too should develop the same type of follow-on course in advanced warfighting studies for selected graduates from their command and staff colleges.

The Advanced Warfighting Schools

To fully understand what each Service's advanced school does and what benefit its students may bring to the joint fight, first the schools will be described individually in terms of the mission, curriculum, student composition and selection criteria. Finally, the end product—the graduates—of each school are also described.

School of Advanced Military Studies

The Army's School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has the mission "to educate officers at the graduate level in military art and science in order to produce leaders with the flexibility to solve complex problems in peace, conflict and war."¹³ To apply for admission, candidates must be graduates of the C&GSC or other Service equivalent, have a strong academic record at C&GSC and attain a strong recommendation from their faculty

advisor. Candidates then must pass an entrance exam, take a reading and writing diagnostics test and pass an interview by a SAMS faculty member. Each applicant's package is then reviewed by committee, and the candidates scoring the highest have their names forwarded to the Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) for concurrence. If attendance might negatively affect a candidate's career track, PERSCOM may deny entry.¹⁴

During the 11-month course the students focus on the art and science of planning, preparing and executing full-spectrum military operations. The curriculum consists of four major sections: Military Decision Making, the Development of Operational Art, Contemporary Campaign Planning and the Future of Military Operations. The object of the course is to produce officers who can serve 12-month tours in critical Army battlestaff positions within division or corps headquarters (HQ). The 2003 class consisted of 79 students (67 Army, 6 Air Force, 2 Marine Corps, 1 Navy and 3 international officers).¹⁵

School of Advanced Warfighting

The Marine Corps' School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW) at Quantico, Virginia, has the mission to produce officers who are problem solvers by concentrating on decision-making and complex problem-solving experience at the operational level of war using historical and contemporary issues as a framework and building blocks. SAW focuses on the link between what warfighters must do to win campaigns (operational art) and how they prepare themselves for that task (prepare for war)—problem solving.¹⁶

To apply for admission, students must be graduates of Command and Staff College (C&SC) or other Service equivalent, have a strong academic record at C&SC and obtain a recommendation from their faculty adviser. Candidates then must pass an interview board consist-

ing of the military and civilian staff of the C&SC and SAW. Each applicant's performance is assessed and those scoring the highest are forwarded for approval.¹⁷

The curriculum consists of three major sections: Foundations of the Operational Art, Operational Planning and Future War. The course strives to help students "understand the relationship between preparation for and conduct of war, and contribute actively to the preparation for and execution of military/naval campaigns by enabling commanders to make better use of the resources of the supporting establishment, the military departments, and other assets and capabilities beyond the Department of Defense (DoD)."¹⁸ Throughout the course the students are given complex problems and a mass of supporting information to process and then forced to solve the problem. The students read 1,200-1,500 pages of text per week, prepare a graduation thesis and participate in numerous staff rides throughout the United States, Europe and the Middle East.¹⁹

The object of the course is to produce officers who can serve 12-24-month tours in critical Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ), combatant command and Joint Staff operational planning billets. The Marine Corps limits Marine attendance to 15 students of a class of 24.²⁰ The 2001 class consisted of 24 students (15 Marine, 2 Army, 3 Air Force, 1 Navy, 2 international officers and 1 interagency representative).²¹

School of Advanced Air and Space Studies

The U.S. Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS) at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, has the mission to "educate strategists in the art and science of aerospace warfare, thus enhancing the Air Force's capacity to defend the United States through the control and exploitation of air and space." SAASS focuses on educating mid-career officers on the theo-

ries, history, applications, analysis, design and articulation of aerospace strategies, operational concepts and related policies within the general context of conflict, war and deterrence.²²

Officers may be from any discipline but are primarily from operations backgrounds (flying and space-related fields). Prospective students apply for SAASS while attending an ILS. SAASS candidates must be volunteers, possess a master's degree or have an undergraduate GPA of 2.75, have less than 16 years of total active commissioned service and then be selected by an Air Force central selection board. The board is usually composed of Air Force general officers and colonels, with the Air University commander as board president. The 2003 class consists of 27 total students of which 25 are Air Force. The Army and the sea services are each allocated one slot in each class.²³

The SAASS curriculum also uses three sequential courses of education. Students begin with the study of the broad ideas ranging from the classical military, air and space power theory then progress to contemporary analytical techniques. The second phase of study provides the students with the historical basis to evaluate the concepts presented in the first phase. The final phase allows the students the opportunity to bring it all together by applying the information studied throughout the curriculum. Students read approximately 1,200-1,500 pages per week. In addition, the curriculum includes computer wargaming, case studies and field trips. A student thesis is also a required part of the curriculum.²⁴

Air Force SAASS graduates are selected for follow-on jobs by a general officer panel. Graduates are often placed in the Joint Staff, Air Staff, or unified command staffs as well as the staffs of Major Commands (MAJCOMs) and Numbered Air Forces (NAFs). Some graduates in rated fields (pilots, navigators, etc.) will return to flying-related jobs immediately following

SAASS to fulfill their flying obligations. Many SAASS graduates quickly move up to command positions.²⁵

Navy Operational Planner Course

The Naval Operational Planner Course (NOPC) is a three-month extension to the core ten-month Naval War College curriculum. Detailed and intense deliberate planning, crisis action planning and wargaming are designed to impart both naval and joint planning skills to junior warfighting officers. The NOPC was developed during 1997-1998 in response to a Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel recommendation for a Navy advanced warfighting course similar to SAMS, SAW and SAASS. The program was fully implemented in August 1999.²⁶

While the NOPC curriculum may focus on maritime issues at times, the inherent nature of naval warfare at all levels necessarily forces joint interaction. Like SAW, NOPC has heavy representation by other Services, approximately 40 percent. Unique to the NOPC is a Coast Guard officer billet for each class.²⁷ This diversity further enhances the experience; students become involved in tasks and subject areas well outside their Service-specific disciplines. Absent, however, from the student body in a significant way is the interagency process except for the Coast Guard. Interagency processes are examined through role-play during planning exercises and guest lectures. Subjectively, NOPC seeks to develop the skills a joint/interagency staff may use immediately.

NOPC also responds to the pressure of Navy officer career planning by adding a relatively painless three-month extension to the officer's Naval War College posting.²⁸ This permits the personnel management system to sufficiently populate sea-going Navy billets.

An immediate joint follow-on tour is desirable; however, the Service requirement to populate at-sea billets remains an intractable higher priority. At the heart of this discussion lies a

fundamental tension between the Navy's requirement to fill at-sea aviation/shipboard billets and fulfill joint skills development. Without a dedicated staff corps, that challenge will chronically affect the optimum population of both joint and Navy staffs.

With a throughput of only ten officers per year, the problem is also volume. In a recent General Accounting Office study, the DOD is criticized for its inability to specify exactly how many total O-4—O-6 joint billets are required and what the Service billet distribution is. Almost certainly, the Navy War College/NOPC would have to graduate significantly more officers per year.²⁹

Shortfalls

The Services' AWS are great success stories in military education. The graduates have been placed in important Service planning and strategy billets with great effect. They helped craft the campaign strategy for the Army in DESERT STORM. They helped plan numerous contingency operations over the course of the last ten years. They helped develop new Service operating concepts. In all, the graduates have made a significant impact in getting their Services to think, plan and fight more effectively. Some of these officers are beginning to reach the general officer ranks (in the Army), and high percentages have been selected for promotion and command. In the aggregate, these officers have been force multipliers in their follow-on Service billets. As good as these programs are for the Services, they can be even more effective if they teach these officers how to think, plan and fight from a joint perspective.

The AWS tend to be Service-centric—by design and composition. However, these officers are expected to be the experts when it comes to employing their Services in joint campaigns. According to several recent graduates and current students, while the schools cover joint war-

fighting, the emphasis is on how to employ their own Service. As such, many of the plans or solutions tend to be Service-centric.

The focus and the curriculum for these schools vary significantly. The Army and Marine Corps strive to develop operational planners and thinkers. The Army is the strongest in the area of plans generation. The Marine Corps tends to be the strongest in complex problem solving. The Air Force focuses less on planning, but excels in the study of future air and space warfighting. The Navy's three-month course focuses on specific operational staff planning skill sets as a follow-on to its ILS course and sends a small number of its officers to SAMS, SAW and SAASS (three this year). Obviously, the focus, curriculum and product from each of these courses is very different.

Shortly after graduation, the majority of these graduates end up on a Service planning or strategy generation staff, and because the military fights jointly, they are inevitably engaged in planning their respective Service's contribution to a joint campaign. Two issues arise here. First, the AWS students do not receive the full JPME Phase II academic package as part of their curriculum; in some ways the officers identified as being the most qualified Service planners are not equipped with the academic tools to see how other Services may contribute to a joint campaign. The problem may surface as well on a combatant command or SJFHQ staff if the plans officers approach the problem from a Service-centric viewpoint. Second, the students at the advanced courses have very little opportunity to "network." Since the military will employ its Services in concert as a joint force in future conflict, it is unfortunate that some of the principal planners of the Service contributions to these joint campaigns have so little interaction with each other as students before they reach their planning staffs. If they had more opportunity to interact as students, they would surely be more apt to interface and ask questions of their AWS counter-

parts, thereby approaching their Service planning effort as a joint team instead of from a Service-centric perspective.

The complex contingencies and battlefields of the future will require more than a joint perspective to prevail. Joint/interagency team planning capabilities will be essential. Currently, the advanced schools touch on interagency integration but not to the degree necessary to develop effective operation plans. Several of the schools offer slots to interagency members (one in attendance in 2001) but they are rarely filled.

Solutions

The AWS are clearly one of the true success stories in military education. However, to prepare their students to be more effective planners in the joint arena they require more joint education before graduating. Unfortunately, at present, there is a large gap in the current joint education system—and that gap centers on joint warfighting at the operational level of war.

The National War College focuses its education at the strategic and theater-strategic levels, as it should. The Joint Forces Staff College (*Joint and Combined Warfighting School—Intermediate, at Joint Forces Staff College*)³⁰ at Norfolk focuses on training (*educating*)³¹ junior staff officers in the processes of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). The increasing use of Joint Task Forces, and the coming of Standing Joint Task Forces within each Combatant Command, signals a shift away from single service operations. Majors, Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels who can visualize, plan, coordinate and execute joint campaigns and major operations will be critical to the success of future joint formations and staffs. But, this can only be effectively accomplished if these officers have a joint, vice service, perspective.³²

One of the best ways to meet this requirement is by establishing a JAWS.

The concept of a JAWS is not new. It was proposed as early as 1991³³ and a Joint Staff working group studying JPME recently proposed a JAWS as well.³⁴ It's clear that a requirement exists to educate the best students in joint warfighting, but without destroying the Services' AWS in the process. First and foremost, the core curriculum and focus of those AWS must be re-

tained. They are the foundation from which effective joint thinkers, planners and warfighters are built. They are worthless if they do not produce experts in employing their Service components. Second, a school must not be created that scares the good students away. Good officers want to stay in the operating forces as long as possible and want to command.

In some Services the window for education and staff tours is limited. The Navy placed great emphasis on this and opted for a three-month planning course instead. The Army has very specific career gates its officers must meet to be competitive for command and/or early promotion opportunities. Aviators in all Services are limited in the amount of time they can devote to advanced education and follow-on tours, because they must retain their proficiency as aviators if they ever hope to command a flying unit. All these factors constrict the amount of time available to dedicate to ILS, AWS attendance and follow-on planning staff requirements.

Currently, the only way to earn JPME Phase II credit is to either attend TLS/SSC at National Defense University (NDU) or the three-month Phase II course at Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) in Norfolk, Virginia. The officers attending ILS and the AWS are too junior to attend the first two schools, and after two years of school most Services are not inclined to invest another three months to achieve Phase II certification at JFSC.

With these limitations in mind, one option to achieve a higher level of joint training and interaction for AWS students is to create a stand-alone, one-year post-ILS JAWS.³⁵ Such a course would either be in addition to or eventually replace the individual Service AWS and the graduates would earn JPME Phase II certification. It would be one year long and would select students from the service ILS using the same criteria as the Service AWS. The drawback to such an option is that an effective joint thinker, planner and warfighter must first be a master at doing so from his or her Service's perspective. While this would inculcate a small group of stu-

dents in thinking jointly earlier in their careers, they might not completely grasp the finer points of employing their Service and might in fact be less effective joint planners as a result.

A second option would be to imbed two-week exchange tours for the SAMS, SAW and SAASS students in the other Service's schools.³⁶ During those two-week exchanges the students would learn about the other Services' warfighting planning processes and philosophy and be able to network with their fellow AWS students. After those exchanges the students could conduct several joint planning exercises via secure video teleconference (SVTC). The drawback to that option is that the students get only a couple of weeks to interface with their counterparts and have limited time to conduct collaborative joint planning exercises. In addition, those exchanges would not be robust enough to achieve JPME Phase II certification. The students would still have to go to NDU or JFSC to achieve JPME Phase II certification.

JAWS CAPSTONE

A third option, the best one, is to create a two-month JAWS CAPSTONE course, attended after the conclusion of an AWS course. The students would be brought together in a central location to instruct them in not only the history of joint warfighting, joint planning techniques and historical case studies, but also, more important, how to think conceptually about future joint warfighting. Since those students would be fresh from 22 months of operational planning experience including their ILS and AWS, they would not require the full three-month JPME Phase II course but only a modified one, tailored to their requirements. At the conclusion of the course they would be awarded JPME Phase II certification. Graduates from that advanced course would serve follow-on tours primarily in their Service warfighting headquarters. While they would not serve in a designated "joint" billet, they would bring a joint perspective to their Service warfighting headquarters. With component commands sourcing many of the contin-

gency JTF headquarters, these students will be essential to ensure that the solution their headquarters develops will be joint in design and function. Some of the graduates will be assigned to follow-on tours in a combatant command plans section (as they are now). These graduates will be far better prepared to help develop cogent operational plans that make the best use of available joint assets.

The JAWS class size should range from 120 to 130 students. To enhance cross-pollination the students should be mixed equally from each of the advanced schools and Services aiming to create 12 seminars of 10 to 11 students each. The AWS instructors would accompany their students to the JAWS CAPSTONE and serve as members of the JAWS staff. Using these instructors as part of the JAWS staff solves two problems. First, it ensures that the instructor base is of the highest quality and knows how to think at the operational level and mentor the formulation of cogent plans. Second, to be prepared to teach all of the JAWS students how to think and plan jointly, the AWS instructors will have to augment their personal academic preparations to learn how to think, plan and fight jointly. Over the course of several years, that requirement should act as a forcing function, driving the Service AWS staff to approach their curriculum and planning problems from a more joint perspective.

The only full-time JAWS staff would be an O-6 AWS graduate, a civilian Ph.D., a wargaming coordinator and a one- to two-person administrative support staff. The course could be held in the mid-May to early July timeframe. A combination of retired military with experience as combatant command J-3/5s, retired AWS leaders with joint planning experience, interagency personnel with joint contingency planning/execution experience, think tank personnel and active civilian Ph.D.s could be used to form the core of the JAWS staff—under which the students and AWS faculty would coalesce.

The location of the course is critical. It should be held in a location considered “Service neutral” and close to Joint Staff, Service, and academic and interagency subject matter experts.

The course will produce officers who are thinkers and planners, but above all, problem solvers. They will be armed with a thorough knowledge of joint history, theory and doctrine, and understand the admixture of all three at the operational level of war. In addition, they will be fully conversant with other Service, coalition and interagency/nongovernment organization capabilities. The curriculum should be constructed to attain those objectives. The school should use a combination of lectures, seminars, case studies, war games and staff rides.

The students should receive thought-provoking lectures from subject matter experts on joint planning, SJFHQ lessons learned, problem solving, teambuilding, transformation, the future of war, technology, interagency and joint warfighting. The students, in a seminar setting, would explore case studies on joint warfighting that could start with successful and unsuccessful historical examples of joint planning and warfighting, move to some hypothetical ones, then finish with some of the real-world problems facing combatant commanders.³⁷ The real-world case studies would constitute the graduation exercise for JAWS.³⁸

Each year, four combatant commanders would host three JAWS seminars (three teams of 10-11 students plus staff) for two weeks. During that period, the seminars would conduct a case study of one of that combatant commander’s operational problem areas or potential contingencies. The combatant commander might choose to send the JAWS teams to a SJFHQ as well if he thought that a better use of assets. At the beginning of the exercise, the teams would receive planning guidance from the commander. At the conclusion, each seminar would get an opportunity to brief the combatant commander, elements of the SJFHQ or the entire staffs. Such a graduation exercise would benefit both the hosting combatant command and the students. The

commander gets fresh eyes to look in detail—from a true joint perspective—at one of his pressing issues or looming problem areas. The students get to see first hand how a combatant command or a SJFHQ plans and operates. In addition, all the players would see how individual Service competencies can be translated into joint capabilities for a real-world problem.

JAWS CAPSTONE: Outstanding Issues

Several problems and shortfalls remain before the JAWS will be truly effective. However, the presence of a JAWS CAPSTONE with JPME Phase II certification might rectify some of them. First, the Navy's Naval War College and follow-on NOPC is not a true substitute for an AWS. The current Navy officer career progression does not allow for a student to be out of a fleet billet for more than 13 months. To create a SAMS, SAW or SAASS equivalent education requires 22 months. If the JAWS produced officers who were JPME Phase II complete, the Navy might be more supportive of either sending more of its officers to other Service's AWS (three are attending this year), creating an equivalent follow-on to Naval War College ILS, or supporting a trial run of NOPC graduates directly into the JAWS pipeline. At the least, the number of Navy officer instructors in the other Services' AWS should be increased.

The SAMS, SAW and SAASS curriculum would require modifications to become more joint. The Air Force SAASS curriculum is not currently focused on operation planning or problem solving. If a JAWS CAPSTONE were created, the Air Force would most probably modify its curriculum to prepare its SAASS students to be ready to contribute to a joint planning effort. All three Service AWS would have to modify their curriculum timing and sequencing to carve out two months from their schedule to allow the students to complete JAWS and not negatively affect the summer moving schedule. The Service AWS syllabi must conclude by early May to

allow the students to move Temporary Active Duty/Temporary Duty (TAD/TDY) to the JAWS CAPSTONE and finish by early July.

The Air Force has some unique personnel management challenges associated with rated aviators. The one-year SAASS attendance follows one year of ILS. Attendance at SAASS not only places the graduate out of the operations field for at least two years, but also may adversely affect the already large pilot shortage, which has now expanded to include all rated career fields in the Air Force. In some cases, some of the rated SAASS graduates may have to return to flying billets instead of proceeding to a Service or joint planning staff. In addition, reaching flying “gates” (total number of months aviators have performed actual flying/flying related duties) may be a difficult problem, depending on placement of graduates. Flyers do not receive flight pay if they reach a required flying “gate” and have not accumulated enough flying months. The Air Force is very concerned about that situation, especially when combined with the rated shortage. In several instances, rated aviators have gone from one staff job to the next level staff job only to be immediately returned to flying billets because of rated manning problems or lack of gate months.

In addition, the Services’ personnel centers should track graduates of the JAWS CAPSTONE to ensure proper use of those graduates during the remainder of their careers. This could be in the form of a Special Experience Identifier (SEI) or Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) code. In fact, the Marine Corps has recently begun to issue a specific MOS for SAW graduates.

Conclusion

To fight effectively as a joint force officers must be educated to think, plan and fight as joint warfighters. In the years following the Vietnam War, the Services addressed operation planning deficiencies in their officer corps by creating AWS. Those schools have proven their worth in

creating field-grade officers not only schooled in the operational art, but trained as problem solvers and “out of the box” thinkers. The schools have made a tremendous difference, helping the Services think, plan and fight smarter. It’s now time to translate those gains in Service PME to JPME, with the creation of a JAWS CAPSTONE course.

The creation of a JAWS CAPSTONE would generate several positive second- and third-order effects. First, to prepare their students for success at the JAWS CAPSTONE the Services will slightly modify their AWS focus and curriculum to make them more joint. In addition, the instructional staff of each of the Service schools should be more motivated to become students of joint warfighting since they must teach it at the JAWS CAPSTONE.

Second, attendance at JAWS CAPSTONE will create a new generation of Service planners and warfighters instructed in how to think, plan and fight jointly. Those officers will be the primary Service operation planners for the next ten years and possibly the joint Service leaders in the next 20. Instituting a JAWS CAPSTONE drives joint warfighting from the middle grade ranks and builds a foundation for future Service and joint force leadership.

Third, these officers will “network,” learning from and making acquaintances with key operation planners from the other Services long before they would on a normal career progression. Currently, the first time large pools of officers get to work with other Service representatives is at the O-5 or O-6 level on a joint staff or at the National War College. Teaching the most qualified operation planners in each Service to plan together as O-4s can improve joint inculcation by up to nine years.

In the near term, the JAWS CAPSTONE graduates will know their counterparts in the component staff planning sections, who to call if they have questions and their counterparts’ capacity to help them solve operational problems. The profusion of SJFHQs for contingency operations

mandates that they be staffed with competent joint operation planners on day one. Currently, many AWS graduates are being assigned by their Services to planning billets in SJFHQs, bringing with them a high-quality Service planning competency, allowing that SJFHQ to think, plan and operate more effectively. A JAWS CAPSTONE graduate will bring that same capability, enhanced with joint planning instruction and expertise.

Lastly, the JAWS CAPSTONE may be used as a laboratory to investigate new concepts and new ways to solve existing/emerging problems from a joint perspective. The JAWS CAPSTONE students will have been studying the art of war and problem solving for 22 months. As a collective unit, they may offer a unique perspective on the problems or challenges faced by the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, combatant commanders, Service chiefs or interagency leadership.

In the end, JAWS CAPSTONE will create officers who know how to think—not what to think—regarding the employment of joint forces at the operational level of war.

NOTES

¹ Joint Staff J-7 Briefing, *Joint Professional Military Education*, 4 February 2003.

² BG Mark Hertling, U.S. Army, interview by Col Jon M. Davis, USMC, *J-7 Joint Staff*, Washington, DC, 4 February 2003.

³ House, *Report of the Panel on Military Education*, 100th Cong., 1st sess., April 21, 1989, 183.

⁴ Charles Edward White, *The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militarische Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801-1805* (Westport, CT, Praeger, 1989), 136.

⁵ Ibid, 136.

⁶ Ibid, 137.

⁷ Ibid, 149.

⁸ Giulio Douhet, *The Command of the Air* (New York, Coward-McCann, 1984).

⁹ Roger Willock, *Unaccustomed to Fear: A Biography of the Late General Roy S. Geiger* (Princeton, 1968), 151.

¹⁰ Leonard Mosley, *Marshall, A Man for Our Times* (New York, Hearst Books, 1982), 96.

¹¹ COL James Greer, U.S. Army, Point Paper “Thoughts on a Joint Advanced Warfighting School,” *School of Advanced Military Studies*, August 2001

¹² Ibid.

¹³ *School of Advanced Military Studies*. Maint. Unknown. 4 October 2002. Command & General Staff College School for Advanced Military Studies Home Page. <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/sams/index.asp> (30 January 2003).

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ COL James Greer, U.S. Army, interview by Col Jon M. Davis, USMC, *School of Advanced Military Studies*, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 13 February 2003.

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- ¹⁶ *School of Advanced Warfighting*. Maint. Unknown. Unknown. Marine Corps University Headquarters Home Page. www.mcu.usmc.mil/mcu/Catalog/schoolofadvancedwarfighting.pdf (30 January 2003).
- ¹⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁸ Ibid.
- ¹⁹ Ibid.
- ²⁰ Ibid.
- ²¹ Col H.T. Ghobar, USMC, interview by Col Jon M. Davis, USMC, *U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College*, Quantico, VA, 25 February 2003.
- ²² *School of Advanced Air and Space Studies*. Maint. MSD/ITSW. 9 January 2003. Air University School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Home Page. <http://www.au.af.mil/au/saass/> (30 January 2003).
- ²³ Ibid.
- ²⁴ Ibid.
- ²⁵ Ibid.
- ²⁶ *Naval Operational Planner Course*. Maint. Unknown. Unknown. Naval War College Naval Operational Planner Course Home Page. <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/jmo/nopc/information.htm> (30 January 2003).
- ²⁷ Chief of Naval Operations Memorandum, "NOPC Instruction," Naval Operational Planning Course, 12 February 1999.
- ²⁸ *Naval Operational Planner Course*.
- ²⁹ General Accounting Office, *Military Personnel: Joint Officer Development Has Improved, but a Strategic Approach is Needed*, GAO, GAO-03-238, December 2002, 17.
- ³⁰ *Joint and Combined Warfighting Course-Intermediate*. Maint. DEANJCWS-I. 15 January 2003. Joint Forces Staff College Home Page. <http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/jcsos/jcsoshm.htm> (3 March 2003).
- ³¹ Ibid.
- ³² Greer, Point Paper "Thoughts on a Joint Advanced Warfighting School."
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- ³⁴ Briefing, *Joint Professional Military Education*.
- ³⁵ Hertling, J-7 Joint Staff, interview by Col Jon M. Davis, USMC
- ³⁶ Ibid.
- ³⁷ Dr. Eliot Cohen, interview by Col Jon M. Davis, USMC, 3 February 2003.
- ³⁸ LtCol Jeff Hoing, USMC, interview by Col Jon M. Davis, USMC, *School of Advanced Military Studies*, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 January 2003.

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